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SCIENCE AS A POWERFUL PRACTICE
NANCEY MURPHY

G

eoffrey Cantor’s paper, “Quakers and Science: An Overview,” is
a valuable study of the complications involved in forming a judgment about the participation of Quakers in science, relative to that of
others. He points in particular to the difficulty of knowing the attitudes of those who have not addressed the subject in writing. What I
found most interesting in the paper was his attention to the question
of why Quakers tended to choose to study biology rather than
physics, and in particular his thesis that observational sciences were
preferred to mathematical ones due, on the one hand, to the high
value placed on observation of nature for its own sake, and on the
other to suspicion of the pride involved in speculative reason.
Grace Jantzen’s paper scarcely mentions science, dealing instead
with the role of Quakers in providing technological resources for the
industrial revolution. It does have the value of raising the question of
how to relate to morally ambiguous societal structures and powers.
She asks whether the industrial revolution and the capitalist system
with which it is associated was, on the whole, a good thing to which
to contribute, and also points to the difficulties for pacifists in defining what does and does not constitute participation in warfare.
The message I take from these two papers together is recognition
of the complexity of judging social practices (such as science) and the
difficulties of avoiding practices judged to be evil (e.g., warfare). So
what I hope to do here is to provide some conceptual resources for
thinking about the morality of science as a social practice. My chief
resource is the ethical work of Alasdair MacIntyre. I shall correct and
amplify his contribution using the works of Radical-Reformation theologians James McClendon and John Howard Yoder.
In his highly acclaimed After Virtue MacIntyre set out to revive
and repair the tradition of moral reasoning that focuses on the
virtues.1 The central problem for the virtue tradition is the fact that
there are competing catalogues of virtues. For example, Quaker
humility would have been counted a vice in many contexts in Ancient
Greece, while for Aristotle, the exercise of theoretical reason was
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humankind’s highest calling. So how are we to know which qualities
truly deserve the designation of “virtue”?
MacIntyre’s move to answer this question begins with a technical
definition of a practice:
By a “practice” I am going to mean any coherent and complex
form of socially established cooperative human activity through
which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the
course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which
are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and
human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.2
Virtues can then be defined in a preliminary way as acquired human
characteristics that are necessary for the achievement of goods internal to practices. Science is a practice in this sense. The chief internal
good at which it aims is, of course, knowledge. (Internal goods are
distinguished from external goods, those not intrinsic to the practice
itself, such as financial rewards.) Qualities necessary for the achievement of science’s internal goods include, as the Quakers realized,
appreciative observation of nature and honesty. These are therefore
virtues for the scientist.
MacIntyre’s account cannot end here because of the simple fact
that one cannot participate in all social practices—one has to choose
among them and balance one’s participation in those one does
choose. In order to make such decisions, individuals need to ask how
a given practice fits into the whole of their own life stories. For example, should science be avoided if the passion it requires interferes with
one’s religious duties? Should missionary work be avoided at this
stage of life if it interferes with one’s domestic responsibilities?
MacIntyre further claims that these life stories themselves need to
be evaluated in light of some concept of the telos—the goal or purpose—of human life as such. But to know what the purpose of human
life is requires an account of ultimate reality, such as is provided by
large-scale philosophical or religious traditions. Such an account
allows us to decide, for instance, whether religious observance takes
precedence over the acquisition of knowledge of nature, or whether
evangelism is more important than marital duties. Thus, MacIntyre
argues against the grain of modern moral theories that sought to free
moral reasoning from religious tradition.
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So far I hope to have shown that MacIntyre provides excellent
resources for ordering the questions that need to be asked regarding
the morality of participation in science; namely, what are the virtues
required for achieving the goods internal to science, and how might
one go about fitting the practice of science into a good life, directed
toward the intrinsic goals of humankind as perceived by one’s tradition? However, MacIntyre has been criticized for an overly optimistic
account of social practices. He has defined them as aiming at the
achievement of goods. While institutions can deform practices, he
believes, practices themselves are inherently good. What then are we
to make of criticisms such as the claim that science is aimed at domination of nature. And what are we to say of military activity—are
there not military “practices” as well?
A more helpful understanding of social practices is found in the
writings of James McClendon and other theologians in the RadicalReformation tradition. These theologians have benefited from New
Testament scholars’ recovery of the Apostle Paul’s doctrine of the
principalities and powers. These powers include governmental, religious, and social institutions. According to Paul, they are God’s creatures, designed for ordering human life, yet they are “fallen” in the
sense that they tend to pursue their own ends rather than serving
God’s purposes. McClendon forges a concept of “powerful practices”
by considering social practices in light of the moral ambiguity Paul
attributed to institutions of power.
McClendon says that wherever Christ’s victory is proclaimed, the
corrupted reign of the powers is challenged, and yet they remain in
being—in the time between the resurrection and the final coming of
Christ, they remain in an ambiguous state. They delimit and define
the social morality of Jesus’ followers; to them the disciple must witness concerning the reversal of power achieved in Christ’s resurrection. There is a hint in the New Testament that the final destiny of all
these powers—civil, military, economic, traditional, cultural, social,
and religious—will be not their abolition but their full restoration
(Eph. 1:10; 3:10). “So the task of Christians confronting a world of
powerful practices…requires almost infinite adjustments, distinction,
and gradations.”3
What McClendon’s analysis shows is that we should not expect to
be able to make distinctions between practices that are thoroughly
evil and those that are thoroughly good—we should expect to find
varying mixtures of divine providence and self-serving corruption.
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Christians need constant discernment regarding when and how to
participate or withdraw.
A second conclusion, and this is confirmed by Jantzen’s analysis,
is that the adjustments and distinctions that Christians make in confronting powerful practices such as science or industry will depend on
eschatology—that is, on the doctrine of last things. Jantzen has called
attention to the difference made by expectations that the end is far or
near. Early Quakers’ enthusiasm for radical social change waned when
they lost confidence in the imminent arrival of the Kingdom of God.
Jantzen is critical of Quakers’ accommodation to the saeculum, and
so the question for all of us who do not expect the end of this world
to come soon is how to live in the interim.
McClendon’s analysis points to an equally important question:
will the end involve restoration or destruction of the present order?
There are two extreme views regarding the Kingdom of God. One is
exemplified in the nineteenth-century liberal Protestant view that
equated the Kingdom with inevitable human progress. The opposite
view is prevalent among American fundamentalists; namely, that the
Kingdom begins only after the end of the present aeon. The former
view promotes indiscriminate participation in societal practices, but
leaves one open to disillusionment when it becomes empirically obvious that the world is not the Kingdom. The latter encourages withdrawal.
McClendon and Yoder both take a middle position. Yoder claims
that the New Testament sees our present age, from Pentecost to the
parousia, as a period of the overlapping of two aeons. These are not
distinct periods of time, for they now exist simultaneously. They differ in nature or direction. One points backwards to human history
before or outside of Christ; the other points forward to the fullness
of the Kingdom of God, of which it is a foretaste.4 Thus, while there
will be a radical transformation, we must expect continuity as well as
discontinuity.
I am not able to present Yoder’s arguments for his position here,
but I do want to suggest that this appears to be an eschatology better suited than its rivals for sustaining Christians in the difficult task
of discerning when and how to participate in morally ambiguous
social practices. I have provided no recipe for determining proper
Christian attitudes toward warfare, science, industry, capitalism, but I
hope to have accomplished two things: One is to have presented a

SCIENCE AS A POWERFUL PRACTICE

• 113

rationale for expecting that there will be no simple, clear-cut answers.
The other is to have offered a catalogue of the questions that need to
be considered in forming such judgments.
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